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The extent to which cognition is verbally mediated in neurotypical individuals is the subject of debate in 
FRJQLWLYHQHXURSV\FKRORJ\DVZHOODVSKLORVRSK\DQGSV\FKRORJ\6WXG\LQJ³YHUEDOWKLQNLQJ´LQ
developmental/neuropsychological disorders provides a valuable opportunity to inform theory building, as well 
as clinical practice.  In this paper, we provide a comprehensive, critical review of such studies among 
individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD).  ASD involves severe social-communication deficits and 
limitations in cognitive/behavioural flexibility.  The prevailing view in the field is that neither cognition nor 
behaviour is mediated verbally in ASD, and that this contributes to diagnostic features.  However, our review 
suggests that, on the contrary, most studies to date actually find that among people with ASD cognitive task 
performance is either a) mediated verbally in a typical fashion, or b) not mediated verbally, but at no obvious 
cost to overall task performance.  Overall though, these studies have methodological limitations and thus clear-
cut conclusions are not possible at this stage.  The aim of the review is to take stock of existing empirical 
findings, as well as to help develop the directions for future research that will resolve the many outstanding 
issues in this field. 
Keywords:  Inner speech; private speech; executive functioning; cognitive flexibility; memory; motor control; 
autism 
  




The debate about the relation between language and thought is rich and has a long history in philosophy, 
psychology, and ± more recently ± cognitive neuropsychology (e.g., Davidson, 1973; Fodor, 1975; Whorf, 
1956).  In relation to the topic of the current paper, Vygotskian theories are particularly (but certainly not 
exclusively) relevant, because they focus on the development of this relation and, in particular, because they 
have been the biggest influence to date on research into verbal thinking in autism spectrum disorder (ASD), 
which is the focus of the current paper. 
According to Vygotskian theory, language and basic forms of WKRXJKW³HOHPHQWDU\PHQWDOIXQFWLRQV´GHYHORS
along parallel trajectories initially before fusing together at around seven years of age among typically 
developing (TD) children.  Vygotsky outlines the developmental trajectory of verbal thinking as follows; from 
early in life ± shortly after language emerges ± children employ overt self-WDON³SULYDWHVSHHFK´DVDPHDQVRI
guiding their attention and aiding problem solving.  At around age seven, the use of private speech declines 
UDSLGO\JRLQJ³XQGHUJURXQG´WRIRUPLQQHUVSHHFK$WWKLVSRLQWVygotsky argues, thinking takes place in 
speech (as opposed to visual imagery, primarily), and allows for uniquely human forms and levels of cognitive 
and behavioural flexibility, and self-regulation.  According to (neo-) Vygotskian theory, verbal thinking has 
social-communicative origins, emerging initially from the dialogic exchanges that children have with others 
(especially caregivers) early in life (see Fernyhough, 2008).  For example, when caregivers scaffold FKLOGUHQ¶V
problem solving through verbal instruction and encouragement, an internalisation of the exchange takes place 
such that when children are required to problem solve on their own they are able to view the problem not only 
from their own perspective, but also from the (now internal) perspective of the caregiver.  This idea is a key one 
LQ9\JRWVN\¶VEURDGHUVRFLR-FXOWXUDOWKHRU\³$Q\IXQFWLRQLQWKHFKLOG¶VFXOWXUDOGHYHORSPHQWDSSHDUVWZLFHRU
RQWZRSODQHV)LUVWLWDSSHDUVRQWKHVRFLDOSODQHDQGWKHQRQWKHSV\FKRORJLFDOSODQH´SThe 
crucial implication is that Vygotskian theory predicts any impediment to engaging in meaningful dialogic 
exchanges with others early in development will result in the atypical development of verbal thinking and, as a 
result, cognitive/behavioural inflexibility and difficulties with self-regulation.  This pattern of deficits is 
strikingly similar to the profile of behavioural impairments that are diagnostic of ASD. 
ASD is a developmental disorder characterised by behavioural impairments in social-communication and 
behavioural flexibility (restricted and repetitive behaviour and interests; American Psychiatric Association, 
2013).  These limitations in behavioural flexibility are frequently mirrored by a degree of cognitive inflexibility 
also (e.g., Van Eylen et al., 2011).  It is precisely this kind of inflexibility that Vygotskian theory predicts as a 




consequence of a failure to utilise inner speech.  Moreover, social-communication impairments are seen in 
Vygotskian theory as a direct cause of a failure to utilise inner speech appropriately.  From a theoretical 
perspective, therefore, we have a potentially unifying link between the core behavioural features of ASD via a 
developmental pathway; social communication impairments lead to a relative lack of inner speech use, which 
exacerbates and/or contributes to limited behavioural and cognitive flexibility.   
On the cognitive level, a diminished propensity to employ inner/private speech could explain the profile of 
executive dysfunction that is frequently observed in studies of ASD.  Executive functioning is an umbrella term 
that refers to a set of higher-order abilities that are involved in the control of thoughts and actions in the service 
of goal-directed behaviour.  In particular, executive functions are thought to include inhibitory control, working 
memory, and set-shifting (Miyake et al., 2000), as well as planning (Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996).  Russell, 
Jarrold, and Hood (1999), for example, noted that people with ASD do not show blanket deficits in all aspects of 
executive functioning, but rather perform poorly on tasks (such as the Tower of London and Card Sorting Tasks; 
see below) that require the maintenance in mind of novel and arbitrary rules.  Their reasoning was that if one has 
to complete a task according to a rule that one has not employed directly before, then constant self-reminding of 
WKHUXOHLQLQQHUVSHHFKLVUHTXLUHGIRUVXFFHVVIXOWDVNFRPSOHWLRQ:LWKRXWWKHXVHRILQQHUVSHHFK³JRDO
QHJOHFW´ZLOORFFXUZKHQWKHUHDUHQR cues available in the environment to remind the participant how to 
perform. Taken together, this constellation of social-communication deficits, inflexibility, and executive 
dysfunction characteristic of and unique to ASD could, when viewed from a (neo-) Vygotskian perspective, 
have shared associations with potential inner speech difficulties. 
It is important to state at the outset our view that there are strong theoretical reasons to suppose that inner speech 
use is diminished in ASD, and that this diminution might contribute to behavioural and cognitive difficulties 
experienced by people with this disorder.  Additionally, findings from studies of verbal thinking may hold 
important clinical and practical implications leading to the possible development and implementation of various 
strategies/techniques that could serve to improve executive functioning in ASD.  However, conclusions should 
not be drawn firmly until the relevant empirical research on the issue has been evaluated rigorously.  This is the 
aim of the current review.  There are a number of methodological issues considered throughout the review as 
they apply to particular studies.  These issues are easier to describe in the context of particular studies.  
However, as a guide for the reader, issues that are discussed repeatedly concern matching of participant groups 
for baseline characteristics, inappropriate use of Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) WR³FRQWURO´IRUVLJQLILFDQW




pre-existing between-group differences in baseline characteristics, inappropriate interpretations of interaction 
effects in Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), small sample sizes, and piecemeal approaches to data analysis that 
increase the risk of making type I errors.   
 
Empirical studies of verbal thinking in ASD 
Table 1 summarises the experimental techniques used frequently to assess verbal thinking.  In theory, these 
types of approaches and techniques can be applied to nearly any cognitive-experimental task, but studies of 
verbal thinking in ASD have focussed primarily on five domains of cognition, namely planning, task-switching, 
set-shifting, short-term/working memory, and motor control.  Table 2 summarises studies of verbal thinking in 
ASD, but should be read in the context of the discussion of each study we provide in the text of the paper. 
Planning 
7KHDELOLW\WRSODQRQH¶VIXWXUHDFWLRQVLVLPSRUWDQWIRUHYHU\GD\IXQFWLRQLQJDQGLVFRQVLGHUHGDQH[HFXWLYH
function by many (Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996).  It is well-established that people with ASD tend to show 
diminished performance in everyday planning and on cognitive-experimental, laboratory-administered measures 
of planning ability (e.g., Williams & Jarrold, 2013).  For example, in the classic Tower of Hanoi/Tower of 
London task, participants are required to move coloured discs, one disc at a time, across three (or more) pegs.  
The aim of the task is to move from an initial configuration of pegs (the start-state) to a pre-specified end state 
in as few moves as possible.  The fewer the moves a person takes to reach the goal/end state, the better their 
planning ability.  Russell et al. (1999, p.104) identify the Tower of London task as one of those executive 
function tasks that requires the maintenance in mind of novel, arbitrary rules and, thus, depends on the 
XWLOLVDWLRQRILQQHUVSHHFKIRUVXFFHVV³IURQWDOWDVNVVXFKDVWKH7RZHURI/RQGRQ«LQZKLFKWKHPHDQV-end 
WDVNUHTXLUHVWKHIROORZLQJRIDUELWUDULO\FKRVHQUXOHVVXFKDVµPRYHIURPWKDWFRQILJXUDWLRQRIcoloured balls to 
this configuration¶´ 
Crucially, three studies have explored the effect of completing the Tower of London task (i.e., planning 
performance) under conditions of FRQFXUUHQW³DUWLFXODWRU\VXSSUHVVLRQ´ among individuals with ASD.  
Articulatory suppression involves repeating a simple word or phrase over and over while performing the 
primary task (in this case, the Tower of London).  Under conditions of articulatory suppression, inner speech use 
should not be possible, because verbal resources are exhausted by an overt speech stream that is irrelevant to 




completion of the primary task.  Thus, if planning is verbally mediated, then articulatory suppression should 
detrimentally affect planning performance on the Tower of London task.  If planning is not verbally mediated, 
then articulatory suppression should have relatively little impact on Tower of London task performance.  In 
relation to ASD, more specific predictions can be made.  If inner speech use is diminished in ASD and if this 
diminution contributes significantly to planning difficulties among people with this disorder, then a) Tower of 
London task performance should be significantly poorer among participants with ASD than comparison 
participants when completing the task in silent conditions (because comparison participants will support their 
planning through the spontaneous and beneficial use of inner speech, whereas participants with ASD will not), 
and; b) between-group differences in Tower of London performance should not be apparent when the task is 
completed under articulatory suppression (because removing the capacity of comparison individuals to employ 
inner speech should reduce their planning performance to the level of participants with ASD).   
Wallace, Silvers, Martin, and Kenworthy (2009) had 28 adolescents with ASD and 25 age-, VIQ-, PIQ-, and 
sex-matched neurotypical comparison participants complete the Tower of London in silence, as well as under 
concurrent articulatory suppression.  The dependent variable was the number of extra moves taken to complete 
Tower of London trials over and above the minimum number of moves in which completion would be possible.  
In an ANOVA, the main effects of Group and Condition were significant (indicating diminished planning 
performance across conditions among participants with ASD, and that articulatory suppression negatively 
affected planning performance in both groups).  However, the crucial interaction between Group and Condition 
was not (p = .30) and was associated with a small effect size only (&RKHQ¶Vd = 0.29).  On the basis of this 
overarching analysis, the conventional approach is to conclude that inner speech was employed by both 
participant groups to mediate the task (i.e., both groups were affected by articulatory suppression) and that 
participants with ASD merely showed a general planning deficit that could not be explained by a diminished 
propensity to employ inner speech.  However, Wallace et al. performed additional post-hoc t-tests on the data.  
Statistically, it is not advisable or valid to break down non-significant interactions, in part because it 
significantly increases the risks of producing type I errors as a result of conducting multiple (unnecessary) 
comparisons.  Nonetheless, Wallace et al. reasoned that, given a (relatively) small sample size (and consequent 
risk of making a type II error) and, given their a priori predictions regarding the pattern of results, conducting 
additional post hoc tests was acceptable, on balance.  The additional tests indicated that, within-participants, 
planning performance was significantly less affected by articulatory suppression among participants with ASD 
than among comparison participants.  Moreover, between-group differences in planning performance were 




evident in the silent condition of the task only.  The pattern of results yielded by the post-hoc tests is entirely 
consistent with the notion that planning is less verbally mediated in ASD than in typical development and that 
this difference explains planning deficits among people with ASD.  We urge caution in concluding this firmly, 
however, given that the interaction effect was not significant in the overarching ANOVA.  Even if one accepts 
the grounds suggested by Wallace et al. for conducting the additional post hoc tests, the interpretation of the 
tests themselves is limited by the non-significant interaction effect.  Specifically, given the results from the post-
hoc tests, it may be legitimate to conclude that articulatory suppression significantly negatively affected 
planning performance in one group (neurotypical group), but not the other group (ASD group).  However, it is 
not possible to conclude, further, that articulatory suppression negatively affected comparison participants 
significantly more than it affected participants with ASD (see Gelman & Stern, 2006) ± only a significant 
interaction effect would allow this latter conclusion to be drawn (and even then only with appropriate caution, 
given that significant interaction effects can emerge as a result of measurement issues, rather than substantive 
differences between groups; see Strauss, 2001)1RQHWKHOHVV:DOODFHHWDO¶VILQGLQJVDUHSRWHQWLDOO\LPSRUWDQW 
Williams, Bowler, and Jarrold (2012) also explored the role of inner speech use in planning in ASD.  In their 
relatively small-scale study, 15 adults with ASD, and 16 age-, VIQ-, PIQ-, and sex-matched neurotypical 
comparison participants completed a Tower task in silence and under concurrent articulatory suppression.  The 
dependent variable was similar to the one used by Wallace et al. (2009), namely the total number of moves 
taken to complete the Tower trials on average.  Unlike Wallace et al., Williams et al. did observe a significant 
interaction effect; neurotypical comparison participants were significantly more negatively affected by the 
imposition of articulatory suppression than were participants with ASD.  At the individual level, almost 90% of 
comparison participants were negatively affected by articulatory suppression, whereas only 40% of participants 
with ASD were.   
The findings of Williams et al. (2012), taken in conjunction with the findings of the post hoc tests conducted by 
Wallace et al. (2009), may well suggest that planning is less verbally mediated among individuals with ASD 
than among neurotypical individuals.  However, implicit in the rationale for both studies was the premise that a 
failure to utilise inner speech could explain previously-reported difficulties with planning among people with 
ASD.  In that case, one would expect to see a specific pattern of performance across conditions.  First, 
participants with ASD should manifest a significant deficit, relative to comparison participants, in the silent 
condition of the task.  Second, planning performance should be equivalent among ASD and comparison 




participants in the articulatory suppression condition, because the performance of comparison participants will 
be reduced to the level of ASD participants once their advantage of using inner speech is removed.  In fact, 
however, there were no between-group differences in planning performance in the silent condition of Williams 
HWDO¶VH[SHULPHQW (the effect size - &RKHQ¶Vd - associated with the between-group difference in planning in the 
silent condition was only 0.26), whereas participants with ASD showed significantly better planning than 
comparison participants in the articulatory suppression condition of the experiment (with an associated effect 
size of 0.78),QRWKHUZRUGVLWPLJKWEHSRVVLEOHWRFRQFOXGHIURP:LOOLDPVHWDO¶VUHVXOWVWKDWSHRSOHZLWK
ASD rely less on inner speech to mediate planning than do neurotypical individuals, but it is not immediately 
apparent that one can conclude, further, that a failure to utilise inner speech contributes to difficulties with 
planning in this population.  ,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRQRWHWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWJURXSVLQ:LOOLDPVHWDO¶VVWXG\ZHUHFORVHO\
matched for age, and verbal, and non-verbal IQ (all between-group differences being non-significant and 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKRQO\DVPDOOHIIHFWVL]HDOOGV 
The findings of Williams et al. (2012), in particular, raise the question of how planning was mediated by 
participants with ASD if inner speech is not employed by people with this disorder.  One obvious suggestion is 
that planning is visually mediated among individuals with ASD.  This suggestion seems plausible on the basis of 
the anecdotal evidence that people with ASD have DWHQGHQF\WREH³YLVXDOWKLQNHUV´RUWR³WKLQNLQSLFWXUHV´ 
(e.g., Grandin, 1995; Hurlburt et al., 1994; Kunda & Goel, 2011).  Tentative evidence for the suggestion comes 
IURP:LOOLDPVHWDO¶VSRVW-hoc analyses that revealed planning ability to be associated significantly with 
performance on the Block Design subtest of the Wechsler Scales among individuals with ASD only (ASD: r = 
.64; comparison: r = .03).  The Block Design subtest is considered to be a good measure of visuo-spatial 
ability/perception and, thus, the fact it was associated with planning among participants with ASD only suggests 
that people with this disorder tend to utilise visual processing for the purposes of planning, whereas neurotypical 
individuals clearly utilise inner speech for that purpose.  However, correlational evidence is relatively limited 
for the purpose of proving hypotheses.  What both the studies by Wallace et al. (2009) and Williams et al. 
(2012) lacked is a further secondary task condition (other than articulatory suppression) to test the hypothesis.  
Specifically, dual task studies of inner speech use among neurotypical individuals have often employed three 
secondary tasks; silence, a verbal processing task designed to disrupt verbal processing/inner speech (e.g., 
articulatory suppression), and a task that is equated for general difficulty with the verbal processing task, but 
which is designed to disrupt a capacity other than inner speech use (e.g., foot tapping; Emerson & Miyake, 
2003).  If planning is visually mediated among individuals with ASD, but verbally mediated among 




neurotypical individuals, then the use of an additional secondary task that selectively disrupts visuo-spatial 
processing should produce a particular pattern of results; completing the Tower of London task under conditions 
of articulatory suppression should negatively affect planning efficiency significantly more among neurotypical 
individuals than among individuals with ASD.  Conversely, completing the Tower of London task under 
conditions of visuo-spatial suppression should negatively affect planning efficiency significantly more among 
individuals with ASD than among neurotypical individuals.  +ROODQGDQG/RZ¶VVWXG\ZDVGHVLJQHGWR
test this idea. 
Holland and Low (2010, Experiment 3) had 13 participants with ASD and 13 neurotypical comparison 
participants complete a Tower task under silence, articulatory suppression, and visuo-spatial suppression.  The 
visuo-spatial suppression secondary task involved repeated tapping of four blocks (situated among a number of 
other blocks) in a particular sequence (like a corsi-blocks task; Corsi, 1972).  In this experiment, the dependent 
variable was the time taken to complete trials (rather than number of moves/excess number of moves taken, 
which is a more traditional measure of planning ability).  The predicted interaction effect emerged.  This 
reflected the facts that a) articulatory suppression negatively affected Tower performance among comparison 
participants but not participants with ASD; b) visuo-spatial suppression affected Tower performance negatively 
among both groups of participants equally.  Indeed, visuo-spatial suppression had a greater negative effect on 
planning than articulatory suppression among neurotypical participants.  This latter finding is difficult to square 
with the suggestion that planning is primarily verbally mediated in typical development.  Holland and Low 
argue that the finding that visuo-spatial suppression and articulatory suppression both affected planning 
performance in comparison participants is evidence that dual (verbal and visual) codes are utilised for planning 
in typical development.  While this is possible, it is not in keeping with the findings of studies of inner speech 
use in typiFDOGHYHORSPHQWZKLFKRIWHQUHSRUWD³WUDGHRII´EHWZHHQYLVXDODQGYHUEDOPHGLDWLRQ7KDWLV
studies of, for example, working memory tend to show that only when inner speech use is not possible do 
individuals switch to/prefer to employ visual strategies to mediate the task (e.g., Hale et al., 1996; Hitch, 
Woodin, & Baker, 1989; Ford & Silber, 1994).  Regardless, there are good reasons to be very cautious about 
over-LQWHUSUHWLQJWKHUHVXOWVRI+ROODQGDQG/RZ¶VVWXG\ 
First, the study design employed by Holland and Low (2010) was unusual.  It appears that only a single Tower 
puzzle (which required a minimum of seven moves to complete) was used across all three secondary task 
conditions.  What is more striking is that it appears one and the same trial was used in each condition.  That is, 




participants completed the same trial in silence, under articulatory suppression, and under visuospatial 
suppression.  It is very difficult to interpret results under these circumstances.  The actual Tower task employed 
by Holland and Low comprised nine trials in total, which increased incrementally in complexity (i.e., in the 
minimum number of moves taken to complete each trial).  It seems that participants actually completed all of 
these trials under each secondary task condition, but Holland and Low analysed the data from only one trial (that 
took seven moves to complete).  The trials that took more than seven moves to complete were deemed too 
³relationally complex´ and the trials that took fewer than seven moves were considered as practice trials.  
+ROODQGDQG/RZ¶VUDWLRQDOHIRUWKLVZDVWKDW³WKHRYHUDOOSHUIRUPDQFHRI>FKLOGUHQZLWKDXWLVP@RQD>7RZHU@
task that included all nine trials may mask or dilute any effects of the experimental suppression conditions 
HPSOR\HG´SHowever, apart from this being a highly unusual strategy for analysing data from a Tower 
task, such a selective approach to data analysis runs a significant risk of producing chance results.   
Second, while the inclusion by Holland and Low (2010) of an additional secondary task (other than articulatory 
suppression) represents a methodological advance on previous studies, the particular task used may not have 
been fit for purpose.  The spatial tapping task used was designed to disrupt visuo-spatial processing selectively, 
but it may have disrupted other functions directly relevant for planning too.  Specifically, participants had to 
keep track of a relatively complex and arbitrary sequence of (four repeated) movements.  It is well-established 
that keeping track of arbitrary sequences draws on executive resources, as well as (in the current context) visuo-
spatial resources.  Given that planning is considered an executive ability, demanding executive resources in the 
secondary task would represent a confound, therefore.  Moreover, the secondary task necessarily involved co-
ordinating movements according to rules, so tapped motor skills significantly.  This is not a problem in itself, 
but it is a significant concern when one considers that motor control is a demand of the Tower task.  In effect, 
participants had to make complex movements with one hand (to complete the secondary task), while 
simultaneously moving discs across pegs (to complete the primary task).  These directly competing motor 
demands would surely confound results, especially given that the dependent variable analysed was time taken to 
complete trials (rather than the more standard variant of number of moves taken to complete trials).  Either of 
these potential difficulties could explain the unexpected finding that visuo-spatial suppression negatively 
affected performance of both groups of participants to a significantly greater degree than did articulatory 
suppression. 




A note on group matching; +ROODQGDQG/RZ¶VSDUWLFLSDQWJURXSVZHUHQRWFORVHO\PDWFKHGIRUEDVHOLQH
characteristics.  In particular, participants were matched for verbal mental age (VMA; ASD: M = 11;5, SD = 
5;3; comparison: M = 11;3, SD = 4;0), but not for chronological age (ASD: M = 10;9, SD = 2;4; comparison: M 
= 9;4, SD = 1;7).  Holland and Low report that the between-group difference in age was non-VLJQLILFDQW³S!
´S+RZHYHUWKHGLIIHUHQFHZDVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKDODUJHF value of 3.17 and, according to our 
FDOFXODWLRQVIURPWKHPHDQVDQG6'VSURYLGHGDODUJHHIIHFWVL]H&RKHQ¶Vd = 0.84).  This means that not 
only were groups not equated for chronological age, but also that they could not have been matched for verbal 
IQ.  Verbal IQ is a function of age and mental age.  Hence, if verbal mental age was equivalent in each group, 
yet chronological age was higher among ASD participants than among comparison participants, then 
participants with ASD must have had substantially lower verbal IQs.  Using the formula verbal mental age ÷ 
chronological age  9,4$6'SDUWLFLSDQWVLQ+ROODQGDQG/RZ¶VVWXG\KDGDPHDQ9,4RIapproximately 106, 
whereas comparison participants had a mean VIQ of approximately 121.    
Why is it important to match for baseline characteristics in studies of inner speech use?  If participant groups are 
not matched for these baseline variables, then any between-group differences in experimental measures could be 
attributable entirely to differences in the baseline variables, rather than to differences in diagnostic group status 
(see Mervis & Klein-Tasman, 2004).  It is not reported whether age or verbal abilities were associated 
VLJQLILFDQWO\ZLWKWKHNH\PHDVXUHVRILQQHUVSHHFKXVHLQ+ROODQGDQG/RZ¶V(2006) Experiment 3 (although, as 
we note below on p.16, age was moderately correlated with measures of inner speech use in a different 
experiment reported in the same 2010 paper).  Nonetheless, the failure to match groups closely for baseline 
abilities represents a potential confound in the experiment discussed here.   
 
Summary 
In all three studies of the role of inner speech use in planning, it was reported that articulatory suppression did 
not show a significant detrimental effect on planning performance among participants with ASD (unlike among 
comparison participants).  According to the logic of the dual-task design, this would suggest that planning is not 
verbally-mediated among people with ASD.  However, we argue that this conclusion should be deemed 
tentative at best.  One of the three studies (Holland & Low, 2010) suffered from significant methodological 
limitations that, in our view, prevent any meaningful conclusions being drawn from the results.  In Wallace et al. 
(2009), the lack of an interaction effect that even approached significance in their overarching analysis 




significantly limits the validity of their conclusion that people with ASD relied on inner speech significantly less 
than comparison participants did.  Finally, the study by Williams et al. (2012) did provide positive evidence that 
people with ASD relied on inner speech to mediate planning significantly less than comparison participants did.  
However, there was no evidence that this atypicality had a negative influence on the planning ability of people 
with ASD.  Instead, participants with ASD performed significantly better than comparison participants on the 
planning task in the articulatory suppression condition.   
 
Task switching  
The ability to switch flexibly between different, often competing, tasks is important for everyday functioning, 
but an ability that appears to be diminished among individuals with ASD (e.g., Mackinlay, Charman, & 
Karmiloff-Smith, 2006).  From a Vygotskian perspective, inner speech should facilitate flexible switching by 
providing an ideal means of self-cuing.  ,QHIIHFWLQQHUVSHHFKDOORZVRQHWRUHPLQGRQHVHOIZKDWRQH¶VWDVN
goals are and to cue oneself to switch between different tasks (or mind sets) when necessary.  Modern cognitive 
science has provided empirical support for this notion.  Among neurotypical adults, switching between tasks 
(e.g., responding to the left side of a display on one trial, then the right side of a display on the following trial, in 
alternating fashion) results in lower task accuracy and speed of task completion than repeating the same task on 
all trials (e.g., responding only to the left side of a display on each trial).  The difference in accuracy on/speed of 
completion between task-switch trials and task-UHSHDWWULDOVLVNQRZQDVWKH³VZLWFKFRVW´7KHODUJHUWKHVZLWFK
cost, the more difficult a person finds switching flexibly between tasks.  Crucially, several studies have shown 
that, among neurotypical individuals, articulatory suppression±but not equivalently difficult secondary tasks 
(e.g., foot tapping) that do not tap verbal resources±significantly increases switch costs (e.g., Baddeley et al., 
2001; Baldo et al., 2005; Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Miyake et al., 2004). In other words, preventing inner 
VSHHFKXVHDIIHFWVSHRSOH¶VDELOLW\WRVZLWFKEHWZHHQtasks in a relatively specific manner, supporting the notion 
that inner speech plays a major role in facilitating task switching.    
Two studies have investigated the effect of articulatory suppression on the task switching performance of 
individuals with ASD.  The authors of each study made the prediction that concurrent articulatory suppression 
would not significantly increase the switch cost among participants with ASD because participants with this 
disorder would not tend to mediate the task verbally anyway.  Whitehouse et al. (2006, Experiment 3) compared 
the performance of 23 children with ASD, and 23 verbal ability- and sex-matched comparison participants on an 




arithmetic switching task.  In D³task-repeat´FRQGLWLRQ, participants were required to add one number to another 
number on all trials.  In FRQWUDVWLQD³task-switch´FRQGLWLRQ, participants were required to add one number to 
another number on one trial, then subtract one number from another on the next trial, in alternating fashion.  
Participants completed each condition once under articulatory suppression and once in silence.  Whitehouse et 
al. found the predicted interaction between group (ASD/comparison), condition (task-repeat/task-switch), and 
verbal output (silence/articulatory suppression) in an ANCOVA (non-verbal ability as a covariate).  This 
interaction reflected that articulatory suppression negatively affected performance in the task-switch condition 
among comparison participants only.  In other words, articulatory suppression increased the switch cost for 
neurotypical participants only, suggesting that task switching is not mediated verbally among participants with 
ASD.   
:KLWHKRXVHHWDO¶VVWXG\ZDVVHPLQDOLQWKHILHOGand the finding that participants with ASD were 
unaffected by articulatory suppression on the switching task is potentially revelatory in offering a possible 
explanation for the task switching difficulties that people with this disorder are often reported to have (e.g., Van 
Eylen et al., 2011).  However, the interpretation of findings is not straightforward.  The authors went to 
admirable lengths to rule out alternative interpretations of their finding.  However, some important issues should 
be considered.   
First, the source of the significant interaction effect was not entirely the one predicted by the authors.  Just as 
Williams et al. (2012), and Holland and Low (2010, Experiment 3) report, individuals with ASD did not show 
significant deficits in baseline executive task performance (i.e., when the primary task was completed in 
silence).  Rather, interaction effects in all three studies, including Whitehouse et al., were driven by the 
significantly superior performance of individuals with ASD versus comparison participants in the articulatory 
suppression conditions of the respective tasks.  Thus, it is not clear that any of these studies show inner speech 
impairments, as such.   
Second, a subsequent reanalysis of the data from Whitehouse et al. (2006, Experiment 3) suggests that the 
failure to employ inner speech use among participants with ASD was somewhat apparent, rather than real.  
When Lidstone, Fernyhough, Meins, and Whitehouse (2009) focussed on individual-level, rather than only 
group-level, data, it became clear that task-switching performance was substantially negatively affected by 
articulatory suppression among the majority of participants with ASD (60%).  In other words, only a sub-sample 
RISDUWLFLSDQWVZLWK$6'LQ:KLWHKRXVHHWDO¶VVWXG\ZHUHQRWUHO\LQJRQLQQHUVSeech to mediate the task-




switching measure.  Importantly, this sub-sample of participants whose task performance was unaffected by 
articulatory suppression had a mean verbal mental age of only 7 years 9 months (SD = 1 year; 4 months).  Given 
that participants below approximately seven years of age would not be expected to utilise inner speech to 
support cognitive task performance, it is not necessarily indicative of inner speech impairments that this sub-
sample of participants was unaffected by articulatory suppression (see Williams & Jarrold, 2010).  
Holland and Low (2010, Experiment 1) also explored the effect of articulatory suppression on the same task 
switching paradigm employed by Whitehouse et al. (2006) among 13 children with ASD and 13 neurotypical 
comparison participants.  The results reported were remarkably similar to those reported by Whitehouse et al.  
Switch costs were significantly negatively affected by articulatory suppression among neurotypical participants 
only, which led the authors to conclude that individuals with ASD do not employ inner speech to mediate task 
switching.  Moreover, just as reported by Whitehouse et al., differences between the groups in task switching 
performance were driven by superior performance among participants with ASD in the articulatory suppression 
condition, rather than diminished performance under silent conditions.   
In a second experiment, Holland and Low (Experiment 2) had the same participants who completed Experiment 
1 complete further arithmetic trials (task-switch and task-repeat) under the same FRQGLWLRQVRI³YLVXR-spatial 
VXSSUHVVLRQ´ as in their study of planning (their Experiment 3, discussed above).  Rather than combine all of the 
data from experiments 1 and 2, and then conduct a 2 (Group: ASD/comparison) x 2 (trial type: switch/repeat) x 
3 (Condition: silent/articulatory suppression/visuo-spatial suppression) ANOVA, Holland and Low took a more 
piecemeal approach to data analysis.  First, they partially combined data from experiments 1 and 2 in order to 
perform a 2 x 2 x 2 (rather than 2 x 2 x 3) ANOVA, excluding data from the articulatory suppression condition.  
In other words, they compared the effect on task-switch and task-repeat trials of a) visuo-spatial suppression and 
b) silence among each participant group.  The results demonstrated that participants from both diagnostic groups 
were significantly slower to complete both types of trial in the visuo-spatial suppression condition than in the 
silent condition.  It is important to clarify that this means that switch costs per se were not selectively affected 
by visuo-spatial suppression (relative to silence), but that task performance as a whole was negatively affected.  
Second, Holland and Low combined data from experiments 1 and 2 in a different way and conducted a 2 
(Group: ASD/comparison) x 2 (Condition: articulatory suppression/visuo-spatial suppression) ANOVA on task-
switch trials only.  Data from task-repeat trials and all data from the silent secondary task condition were 
excluded from this second analysis.  The results revealed a significant interaction effect, reflecting the fact that 




participants with ASD were less negatively affected by articulatory suppression than by visuo-spatial 
suppression, whereas comparison participants were equally negatively affected by each type of suppression.  
Third, Holland and Low performed the same ANOVA as in their second analysis, but used performance in task-
repeat trials, rather than task switch trials as the dependent variable.  Results were that visuo-spatial suppression 
and articulatory suppression equally negatively affected performance on task-repeat trials among both ASD and 
cRPSDULVRQSDUWLFLSDQWV+ROODQGDQG/RZFRQFOXGHIURPWKHVHWKUHHDQDO\VHVWKDWWKHLU³ILQGLQJVFDQEH
parsimoniously regarded as evidence for [children with autism] demonstrating impoverished representational 
elaborations in the context of service to executive control, whereby task-switching would otherwise typically 
DIIRUGLQQHUVSHHFKLQDGGLWLRQWRYLVXRVSDWLDOUHVRXUFHV´SS-14).   
One difficulty with the conclusion drawn by Holland and Low (2010) is that the analyses on which the 
conclusion was based were not themselves parsimonious.  As discussed in relation to Wallace et al. (2009), 
failure to find overarching interaction effects limits the conclusions that one can draw from the data.  Aside from 
this issue, several potential limitations with +ROODQGDQG/RZ¶VH[SHULPHQWVGLVFXVVHGLQUHODWLRQWRWKHLU
Experiment 3, above) prevent clear interpretation of experimental results, in our view.  As noted above, 
participant groups were not closely matched for age (or verbal IQ).  This is critical, because Holland and Low 
report that the association between age and the key measure of inner speech use (the extent to which articulatory 
suppression negatively increased the latency switch cost) in Experiment 1 was moderate and negative (r = -.37) 
among participants with ASD.  Remarkably, Williams et al. (2012) found an almost identical correlation 
between age and the size of the articulatory suppression effect on planning among their sample of adults with 
ASD (r = -.36).  Thus, in both studies, the older participants with ASD were, the less their executive functioning 
performance was negatively affected by articulatory suppression.  The fact thatLQ+ROODQGDQG/RZ¶VVWXG\
participants with ASD were substantially older than comparison participants to start with means that between 
group differences in inner speech use could be partially, or totally, the result of differences between the groups 
in chronological age.  Moreover, the ambiguity about whether the visuo-spatial suppression task selectively 
disrupted visuo-spatial processing, or whether it also tapped executive functioning, makes it difficult to interpret 
the results from their Experiment 2 (discussed above on p.12).   
Summary 
On the basis of our review, it seems difficult to conclude with any conviction that participants with ASD are 
atypical in recruitment of inner speech to mediate task switching.  It may be the case that individuals with ASD 




employ inner speech for this purpose to a lesser extent than neurotypical participants (although the analysis 
provided by Lidstone et al. does not support this possibility).  However, the potential confounds inherent in both 
existing studies make it difficult to conclude this with certainty.  Even if these confounds are ignored/are 
irrelevant and the experimental results stand, it is not clear what explanatory power the results have.  The fact 
that in Whitehouse et al., and Holland and Low the only between-group differences in task switching 
performance reflected superior performance among participants with ASD (when completing the task under 
articulatory suppression) makes it difficult to conclude that failing to employ inner speech could be considered 
an impairment.  If anything, it could be argued that the reverse is true, namely that neurotypical individuals have 
a deficit in performing multiple tasks (i.e., task switching while talking out loud).   
Cognitive flexibility 
A cognitive construct that bears similarity to task switching is cognitive flexibility.  The latter UHIHUVWRRQH¶V
ability to shift flexibly between different mental operations and is frequently measured using one variation or 
other of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST).  In the WCST, participants are presented with a number of 
stimulus cards, each of which varies on several dimensions (e.g., colour, shape, and number of items), and they 
are asked to match their cards to one of an array of presented cards.  However, participants are not told how to 
match (i.e., on what dimension) but they are given feedback on whether each match they make is correct; thus, 
they must infer the matching rule.  Periodically throughout the task, the matching rule is changed.  The key 
dependent measure of cognitive flexibility is the number of perseverative errors made on the task (i.e., the 
number of times an individual continues to sort by an old rule, after the experimenter has switched the matching 
criterion).  Other measures of performance include the number of categories completed and number of correct 
responses provided.  Multiple studies have observed deficits in WCST performance among individuals with 
ASD (see Van Eylen et al., 2011), regardless of whether the task was computerised or administered manually 
(see Williams & Jarrold, 2013)  
Russell-Smith, Bronwynn, Comerford, Maybery, and Whitehouse (2014) investigated the performance of 17 
children with ASD and 18 neurotypical comparison participants on a modified version of the WCST.  
Participants completed the task under each of four conditions: silence, articulatory suppression, concurrent 
mouthing, and overt self-talk.  In the mouthing condition, children were required to open and close their mouths 
in time to a metronome.  This condition was included to control for general motor demands of articulatory 
suppression.  In the overt self-talk condition, children were required to verbalise their strategies each time they 




sorted a response card.  This self-talk condition is of high importance, because it offers a further opportunity to 
investigate the role of inner speech in mental set-shifting/cognitive flexibility.  If set-shifting is not verbally 
mediated among individuals with ASD and if this explains their characteristic impairments in this domain, then 
encouraging participants to verbalise their strategies in the self-talk condition of the WCST should enhance 
performance relative to performance in all other conditions.  Indeed, this kind of experimental manipulation was 
suggested by Russell et al. (1999) as a direct test of the hypothesis that a failure to employ inner speech 
contributes to executive dysfunction LQ$6'³HQFRXUDJLQJFKLOGUHQZLWKDXWLVPWRHQFRGHWKHUXOHVYHUEDOO\
should improve their performance on executive tasks to a greater degree than the performance of comparison 
chilGUHQ´SThe logic here is that forcing individuals to employ overt self-talk during task performance 
should ameliorate the executive difficulties that they normally experience as a result of not employing inner 
speech. 
In relation to Russell-6PLWKHWDO¶VVWXG\SDUWLFLSDQWVZLWK$6'VKRXOGSHUIRUPVLJQLILFDQWO\OHVVZHOOWKDQ
comparison participants in the silent and mouthing conditions of the WCST, because neurotypical individuals 
will have the advantage offered by the spontaneous use of inner speech in these conditions.  However, in the 
articulatory suppression and self-talk conditions, no between-group differences in performance should be 
apparent; in the articulatory suppression condition, the performance of comparison participants should be 
reduced to that of ASD participants because the usual advantage they gain from utilising inner speech will not 
be possible in the suppression condition.  In the overt self-talk condition, the performance of participants with 
ASD should be enhanced compared to that of comparison participants, because the forced use of language to 
mediate the task should mask the failure of individuals with ASD to mediate the task verbally.  As it turned out, 
this was not quite the pattern of results that Russell-Smith et al. observed. 
Russell-Smith et al. (2014) subjected their data to a series of 2 (Group: ASD/comparison) x 2 (Verbal ability: 
high/low) x 4 (condition order: four levels) x 4 (Condition: silence, articulatory suppression, concurrent 
mouthing, and overt self-talk) ANCOVAs, including age as a covariate (because participant groups were not 
closely matched for age).  The dependent variable in each ANCOVA was the number of categories completed, 
number of correct responses, and number of perseverative errors, respectively.  Broadly, the most important 
results were reflected in significant group x condition interaction effects for each dependent variable.  Russell-
Smith et al. broke down these interactions by exploring performance across conditions within each diagnostic 
group.  In the main, however, they did not report between-group differences in performance.  Within-




participants analyses revealed broadly that WCST performance was equivalent across conditions among 
participants with ASD (i.e., they were not affected by any of the manipulations), whereas comparison 
participants performed a) significantly less well in the articulatory suppression condition than in any of the other 
conditions, and b) significantly better in the self-talk condition than in any of the other conditions.  Russell-
Smith et al. concluded that these UHVXOWVFRQVWLWXWHG³IXUWKHUHYLGHQFHIRUDOLQNEHWZHHQLQQHUVSHHFKOLPLWDWLRQV
DQGH[HFXWLYHIXQFWLRQLQJ´LQ$6'S  However, there are arguably a number of difficulties with the 
study that prevents such a conclusion from being drawn with any conviction. 
First, the groups were not matched closely for age or VIQ (between group differences in these variables 
approached significance and were associated with moderate effect sizes), which is why they were included 
either as a covariate (age) or (unusually) as a between-subjects factor (verbal ability) in the ANCOVAs 
conducted by the authors: ³DVDJHDQGYHUEDODELOLW\ZHUHParginally discrepant across the two groups, these two 
variables were included in the analyses to ensure that these differences were not influencing key results in any 
PHDQLQJIXOZD\´S.  In essence, the logic behind this use of ANCOVA lies the questLRQ³LIWKH
diagnostic groups did not differ on the covariate(s), would the between-group difference in the dependent 
YDULDEOHVWLOOH[LVW"´  Put another, more specific, way, ³would individuals with ASD use less inner speech to 
PHGLDWHWDVNSHUIRUPDQFHLIWKH\ZHUHWKHVDPHDJHDVFRPSDULVRQSDUWLFLSDQWV"´Although use of ANCOVA to 
³FRQWUROIRU´SUH-existing group differences is relatively frequent in ASD research, it is flawed statistically and 
conceptually, and leads to erroneous conclusions about results (see Miller & Chapman, 2001, for an excellent 
discussion of this issue; see Joseph, McGrath, & Tager-Flusberg, 2005a for an excellent discussion of this issue 
in relation to the study of inner speech in ASD).  Use of ANCOVA is subject to two assumptions.  The first is 
that the association between the dependent variable and the covariate is equivalent in each of the groups (the 
³KRPRJHQHLW\RIUHJUHVVLRQVORSHV´DVVXPSWLRQ,f the relation between the two variables differs in magnitude 
or direction across groups, then the subsequent regression model is certain to be inaccurate.  This is particularly 
important in relation to the study of verbal thinking in ASD, because in the few studies that have reported the 
relevant associations, ASD and comparison groups frequently appear to differ (see Liss et al., 2001; Joseph et 
al., 2005a).  Even if regression slopes were equivalent across diagnostic groups in studies of verbal thinking that 
have employed ANCOVA, none of these studies would meet the second assumption of this test, namely that 
groups are equated on the covariDWHWKH³LQGHSHQGHQFHRIFRYDULDWHDQGWUHDWPHQWHIIHFW´DVVXPSWLRQ  
Controlling for non-random group differences (e.g., in age) is not possible using ANCOVA, or any other 
statistical technique.  To quote Fleiss and Tanur (1973, pp.513-517, in Miller & Chapman, 2001, p.43),  





been non-H[LVWHQW«7KHRYHUZKHOPLQJZHLJKW of logic is on the side of those who warn that neither 
the analysis of covariance nor any other statistical technique can undo systematic differences which 
ZHUHRXWRIWKHLQYHVWLJDWRU¶VFRQWURO´ 
Ignoring the issues concerning use of ANCOVA, Russell-Smith et al. (2014) argue that age discrepancies 
EHWZHHQJURXSVSUREDEO\GLGQRWFRQIRXQGUHVXOWVEHFDXVH³DVWKH$6'JURXSZDVVOLJKWO\ROGHURQDYHUDJH
than the typically developing group, if age was influencing results, it should be in the direction of masking inner 
VSHHFKGHILFLWVLQ$6'FKLOGUHQ´SAlthough this argument is intuitively appealing and likely correct in 
some cases/with regard to some domains of cognition, it does not always hold true and cannot therefore be 
relied upon as an a priori justification for not matching groups [see above discussion of Holland & Low (2010, 
Experiment 1) and Williams et al. (2012, Experiment 2)].    
Second, individuals with ASD did not show any impairments on the WCST in the silent condition of the task.  
On the basis of the only between-subjects analyses conducted by Russell-Smith et al. (2010), the authors 
reported that ASD and comparison participants did not differ significantly in the number of perseverative errors 
made, number of categories completed, or number of correct responses made in the silent condition of the 
WCST (between-group differences were associated with only very small effect sizes, dVDV5XVVHOO-
Smith et al. report on p.1239).  Thus, even if individuals with ASD did not utilise inner speech to mediate the 
task in this baseline condition, it is not clear that this detrimentally affected their task performance.  Indeed, 
based on Russell-6PLWKHWDO¶V)LJXUHSLWLVQRWFOHDUWKDWEHWZHHQJURXSGLIIHUHQFHVZHUHDSSDUHQWLQ
any of the conditions for any of the dependent variables.  Therefore, it is not clear what explanatory power the 
study has.  That is, even if one accepts the validity of the results, it is not clear that diminished inner speech use 
in ASD can explain the characteristic limitations in cognitive flexibility that are apparent among individuals 
with ASD.   
Third, the finding that Wisconsin Card Sorting Task performance was not enhanced by overt labelling among 
individuals with ASD, whereas it was enhanced among neurotypical participants, is contrary to predictions.  The 
rationale for including an overt labelling condition was that, if participants with ASD did not spontaneously 
employ inner speech to mediate the task, then requiring them to use overt self-talk should improve their WCST 
performance and bring it closer to the level achieved by neurotypical participants in the silent condition (see 
Russell et al., 1999, also).  This logic has been borne out in studies of inner speech use in other disorders.  




Among people with schizophrenia ± another disorder in which inner speech limitations have been implicated in 
established executive difficulties ± enforcing overt self-talk does appear to improve performance on the WCST 
(Perry et al., 2001).  The fact that enforcing overt self-talk did not improve the WCST performance of 
individuals with ASD suggests, therefore, that we should be cautious in drawing the conclusion that diminished 
inner speech use lies at the core of executive difficulties in ASD.   
Thus far, the literature on inner speech usage in ASD has been dominated by paradigms utilizing articulatory 
suppression (versus various control conditions) to interfere with self-talk.  However, when working with 
younger children, a more commonly utilized approach is to measure overt self-talk, termed private speech, often 
through coding in vivo behaviors.  Private speech can be viewed as the developmental precursor to inner speech, 
particularly given that as Vygotsky documented, when children are asked to complete developmentally 
appropriate problem solving tasks, they typically progress during the preschool years from overt (often 
interpretable) words and sentences to progressively more covert (i.e., less interpretable), ranging from muttering 
to fully internalized, speech.  To date, only one study has examined the influence of private speech on cognitive 
flexibility among individuals with ASD.  Winsler et al. (2007) examined private speech use during completion 
of the WCST by 33 school aged children with ASD, as well as 27 age-matched typically developing (TD) 
children and 21 children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)1.  The authors predicted that 
children with ASD would use significantly less private speech during completion of the WCST than either of the 
other diagnostic groups.  Moreover, they predicted that the private speech that children with ASD did use would 
be less task-relevant than the private speech used by children from each of the other groups.  In other words, 
even when overt self-talk was employed by individuals with ASD, it would not be of the quality or directedness 
necessary to influence task performance positively.  Contrary to expectation, however, no significant differences 
between the ASD and TD groups emerged in either total amount of private speech used or in the extent to which 
private speech was task-relevant, according to omnibus tests (all ps > .25).  Rather, it was the ADHD group that 
showed significantly less task-relevant private speech than the TD group, which replicated earlier findings of 
atypical verbal thinking in this disorder (e.g., Winsler et al., 2000).  Importantly, the ASD group in Winsler et 
DO¶VVWXG\VKRZHGVLJQLILFDQWly poorer WCST performance (in terms of numbers of items correct and number of 
perseverative errors made) than either of the other groups.   
The findings that children with ASD showed clear deficits in cognitive flexibility despite normal use of private 
spHHFKLQ:LQVOHUHWDO¶VVWXG\LVQRWREYLRXVO\LQNHHSLQJZLWKWKHLGHDWKDWOLPLWHGVHOI-talk contributes 




to executive dysfunction in this disorder.  However, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions from Winsler et 
DO¶VVWXG\JLYHQWKDWSarticipant groups were not matched for verbal or non-verbal ability (or gender), which 
could have confounded results.  Although the authors attempted to overcome this limitation by controlling for 
verbal ability in ANCOVAs, this approach does not solve the problem (as discussed immediately above in 
relation to Russell-6PLWKHWDO¶VVWXG\ 
Summary 
Two studies have explored the extent to which cognitive flexibility is verbally mediated in ASD.  Russell-Smith 
et al. (2014) found that articulatory suppression did not interfere with performance on the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Task among participants with ASD, in keeping with their prediction that task performance would not be 
verbally mediated in people with this disorder.  However, there were no notable between-group differences in 
baseline cognitive flexibility, so it is not clear that diminished inner speech use negatively impacted on cognitive 
flexibility in their sample.  In contrast, Winsler et al. (2007) found that Wisconsin Card Sorting Task 
performance was diminished among children with ASD, despite the typical spontaneous use of task-relevant 
private speech.  Thus, taken together, these studies do not support the view that executive dysfunction is the 
result of diminished verbal thinking in ASD.  However, both studies had methodological issues that limit the 
extent to which one can draw conclusions with certainty.   
Short-term and working memory 
,Q%DGGHOH\DQG+LWFK¶VLQIOXHQWLDOZRUNLQJPHPRU\PRGHOWKHSKRQRORJLFDOORRSLVD³VODYH´V\VWHP that is 
specialised for the short-term retention of novel verbal information.  It comprises a short-term store that holds 
verbal information for a limited time to facilitate transference of the information to long-term memory, and an 
articulatory rehearsal process that serves to translate visual information into a phonological form and refresh 
decaying representations in the store.  ,QRWKHUZRUGVLQ%DGGHOH\DQG+LWFK¶VPRGHOLQQHUVSHHFKIDFLOLWDWHV
memory by allowing internal rehearsal of information that would otherwise be forgotten.  Importantly, a 
distinction is drawn in the field between short-term memory and working memory.  Short-term memory refers to 
the temporary storage of visual or verbal information.  Working memory involves both the domain specific 
(visual/verbal) storage of information, as well as some additional (possibly executive) processing of that 
information (e.g., Bayliss et al., 2006).   




Whitehouse, Maybery, and Durkin (2006, Experiment 2) investigated inner speech use in ASD by investigating 
the extent to which children with ASD GHPRQVWUDWHGD³ZRUGOHQJWKHIIHFW´LQVKRUW-term memory.  Among 
neurotypical adults, the spoken duration of to-be-remembered items is negatively associated with the number of 
items recalled (e.g., Baddeley, Thomson, and Buchanan, 1975).  In particular, pictorial stimuli with long names 
HJ³GLQRVDXU´DUHKDUGHUWRUHFDOOWKDQWKRVHZLWKVKRUWQDPHVHJ³EDOO´7KHH[SODQDWLRQIRUWKLVLVWKDW
adults spontaneously recode visually-presented information into a verbal medium and then rehearse this 
information internally; long names take longer to rehearse than short names and, therefore, subject to greater 
decay in the phonological store.  Crucially, the word length effect on serial recall is apparent only from 
approximately seven years of age onwards in typically developing individuals (Hitch et al., 1989a).   
In Whitehouse eWDO¶V([SHULPHQW 2) study, children with ASD and neurotypical comparison participants 
(matched for verbal mental age, reading ability, and sex) completed, under two conditions, a serial recall task 
involving pictorial stimuli that had one syllable, or three or four syllable names.  In one condition, participants 
were instructed to stay silent during the presentation of items in the study phase of each trial, whereas in the 
other condition they were instructed to label each picture as it appeared on screen.  The central prediction was 
that there would be a group (ASD/TD) x condition (silent/label) x word length (one syllable/three or four 
syllable) interaction reflecting a diminished word length effect among participants with ASD in the silent 
condition only.  The rationale here was that children with ASD would not spontaneously employ inner speech in 
the silent condition.  Rather, they would process the pictures visually and would, as a result, be relatively 
unaffected by word length in this condition.  However, in the label condition, in which participants overtly 
named items, a word length effect would be present among all participants.  The actual results were complicated 
to interpret however.  Although the overall group x condition x word length interaction was significant, as 
predicted, a breakdown of the interaction revealed that participants with ASD showed, unexpectedly, a 
diminished word length effect in the silent and label conditions.  One explanation for this pattern is that even 
when overt speech was being employed by individuals with ASD, it was not influencing memory in the same 
way/to the same extent as it was among the TD comparison participants.  If so, this has significant implications 
for strategies designed to foster inner speech use among people with ASD, because it suggests that training inner 
speech use in the form of simple labelling will not be sufficient to influence self-regulation in ASD (see below 
for further consideration of this).   





an earlier finding by Russell, Jarrold, and Henry (1996) who found that children with ASD showed a typical 
word length effect in serial recall.  ,Q5XVVHOOHWDO¶V([SHULPHQWVWXG\items were spoken words (rather 
than pictures, in Whitehouse et al.) and the recall phase (rather than the study phase, in Whitehouse et al.) had 
two conditions.  In one condition (verbal recall), participants recalled items verbally immediately after 
presentation, whereas in the other condition (non-verbal recall), participants were required to point to pictures of 
the presented spoken items in correct serial order.  Results indicated that, relative to children with intellectual 
impairment and TD children (matched for VMA only), participants with ASD did not show a diminished word 
length effect in either recall condition.  Interestingly, participants with ASD showed a significantly greater word 
length effect than children with intellectual impairment in the non-verbal recall condition, implying enhanced 
reliance on inner speech to mediate the task among this sample of children with ASD.   
Given the conflicting findings regarding the word length effect among people with ASD, Williams, Happé, and 
Jarrold (2008) explored another manipulation to the structure of items in a serial recall task (other than word 
length).  Arguably the gold standard evidence for the verbal mediation of short-term memory is a demonstration 
of the phonological similarity effect, rather than the word length effect.  Among TD children from the age of 
seven years onwards, serial recall of pictorial items is negatively affected by the phonological similarity of the 
items to be recalled; items with similar sounding names (e.g., cat, hat, mat) are less easily recalled than items 
with dissimilar sounding names (e.g., ball, cow, shoe).  In contrast, serial recall among children below 
approximately age seven years is affected not by the phonological similarity of items to be recalled, but rather 
by the visual similarity of those items.  Hence, pictures with similar appearances (e.g., a pen, a knife, and a tie, 
all presented in the same orientation) tend to be recalled less well by young children than pictures with 
dissimilar visual appearances.  This implies that the shift from the visual to the verbal mediation of short-term 
memory takes place at around age seven in typical development.  Williams et al. investigated this by comparing 
serial recall of phonologically similar, visually similar, and control pictures (that were neither phonologically 
nor visually similar) among a group of children with ASD and a group of age, VIQ, and NVIQ-matched 
comparison participants.  Crucially, participants from both diagnostic groups were divided according to whether 
their verbal mental age was above or below seven years.  Results suggested that short-term memory is mediated 
entirely typically in ASD; ASD and comparison participants with VMAs over seven years showed a 
phonological similarity effect of equivalent magnitude, whereas ASD and comparison participants with VMAs 
below seven years showed a visual similarity effect of equivalent magnitude.  This suggests that the short-term 




memory is mediated in a developmentally typical fashion among individuals with ASD.  This is not consistent 
with the idea that inner speech use is impaired in ASD. 
Williams, Bowler, and Jarrold (2012, Experiment 1) also investigated the phonological similarity effect in ASD, 
but employed articulatory suppression as an additional means of assessing inner speech.  In their study, serial 
recall of phonologically similar and dissimilar (control) pictorial stimuli was assessed among adults with ASD, 
and age-, VIQ-, and PIQ-matched neurotypical comparison participants.  In one condition (silent condition), 
participants remained silent as they studied the stimuli on each trial.  Then, immediately after the study phase, 
participants attempted to recall the pictures they had seen in the order they had seen them.  In the other condition 
(articulatory suppression condition), participants repeated a simple word at a rate of one word per second 
throughout the study phase of each trial.  Immediately after the study phase was completed, participants stopped 
repeating the specified word and attempted to recall the pictures in correct serial order.  Engaging in articulatory 
suppression during the study phase of a short-term memory task should prevent the verbal recoding of visually-
presented items and their subsequent covert rehearsal (because resources of the phonological loop are already 
exhausted by articulatory suppression).  In the articulatory suppression condition, therefore, participants should 
be restricted to processing items visually and, thus, should not show a phonological similarity effect.  Results 
indicated no hint of any difference between ASD and comparison participants in either levels or patterns of 
performance.  Both groups showed a large phonological similarity effect in the silent condition, replicating the 
finding of Williams et al. (2008) and indicating that items were recoded into a verbal form and covertly 
rehearsed.  Moreover, recall was affected negatively among both groups by articulatory suppression and the 
phonological similarity effect was eradicated in the articulatory suppression condition.   
The findings of Williams et al. (2008, & 2012, Experiment 1), following Russell et al. (1996), provide 
convergent evidence that inner speech is used for the purpose of short-term memory in ASD.  One potential 
difficulty with interpreting the results of the former two studies, however, is that participants were required to 
overtly label all pictorial items prior to beginning the experimental task.  This procedure could represent a 
significant confound, because it may have encouraged individuals with ASD to internally label items when they 
would not otherwise have done so spontaneously.  That is, it may have acted as a cue to employ inner speech 
among individuals who would not have done so if they had not been cued to.  There are two reasons to believe 
that this approach/procedure did not confound results, however.  First, in Williams et al. (2008) neither 
participants with ASD nor comparison participants who have verbal mental ages under seven years manifested a 




phonological similarity effect despite the fact these participants overtly labelled items in exactly the same 
manner as all other participants in both Williams et al. (2008) and Williams et al. (2012, Experiment 1).  If it 
was the case that merely overtly labelling items prior to the experiment resulted in an artificial use of inner 
speech in ASD, then this should have been observed in all participants.  Second, the procedure was originally 
employed in order to ensure that evaluation of the phonological similarity effect was not contaminated by 
inaccurate labelling of items.  That is, if participants with ASD really were using inner speech, but merely used 
XQFRPPRQODEHOVIRULWHPVHJ³sparrow´LQVWHDGRI³bird´GXULQJFRYHUWUHKHDUVDOWKHQDphonological 
similarity effect would not have emerged and a false conclusion would have been drawn that short-term memory 
was not verbally mediated in ASD.  This issue might be relevant when considering a final study of inner speech 
use for short-term/working memory in ASD by Joseph, Steele, Meyer, and Tager-Flusberg (2005b) 
Joseph et al. (2005b) looked at the extent to which working memory was verbally mediated in ASD.  Twenty 
four children with ASD and 24 comparison participants (closely matched for age, VIQ, and PIQ) completed two 
versions of a self-ordered pointing task, counterbalanced across participants.  In a standard self-ordered pointing 
task, participants are presented with a series of arrays, each array of which contains the same items but in a 
different spatial arrangement on each trial.  The aim is to point to a different item on each trial, which requires 
the storage and processing of visually-presented information.  The crucial experimental manipulation in Joseph 
HWDO¶VVWXG\ZDVWKDWLQDYHUEDOFRQGLWLRQLWHPVZHUHHDVLO\QDPHDEOHVLQJOH-syllable objects (e.g., cake, 
shirt), whereas in a non-verbal condition items were difficult-to-name abstract shapes.  Joseph et al. predicted 
that participants with ASD would show impaired self-ordered pointing in the verbal condition only, because 
unlike comparison participants they would not benefit from the spontaneous use of inner speech to internally 
label and rehearse the easily-nameable items in the condition.  Conversely, Joseph et al. predicted equivalent 
performance across groups in the non-verbal condition, because items were non-nameable and thus both groups 
would be forced to encode, store, and manipulate purely visual representations of items, meaning that 
comparison participants could not benefit from a natural tendency to use inner speech to support task 
performance.  As predicted, Joseph et al. observed group x condition interactions with respect to the dependent 
variables of memory span and the number of error-free trials completed, respectively.  These interactions 
reflected that participants with ASD a) performed significantly less well than comparison participants in the 
verbal condition of the task only, and b) showed a flat profile of performance across conditions, unlike 
comparison participants who performed better in the verbal condition than in the nonverbal condition.   




The results of Joseph et al. (2005b) appear out of keeping with the results reported by Williams et al. (2008, 
2012) and Russell et al. (1996).  In both studies by Williams et al. it was clear that individuals with ASD were 
capable of spontaneously recoding visually-presented information and rehearsing it.  Why, then, did individuals 
ZLWK$6'LQ-RVHSKHWDO¶VVWXG\QRWGRWKHVDPHDQGEHQHILWIURPYHUEDOPHGLDWLRQLQWKHYHUEDOFRQGLWLRQRI
the task?  When considering this it is important to bear in mind that Joseph et DO¶VVWXG\LVULJRURXVLQHYHU\
detail and avoids the potential confounds that we believe are likely to have influenced other studies of inner 
speech use in ASD.  One possible reason for the discrepancy between studies is that Joseph et al. focussed on 
working memory (i.e., the short-term storage and concurrent processing of information in mind), whereas the 
remainder of the studies explored short-term storage only.  Perhaps individuals with ASD spontaneously recode 
visual information into a verbal form and then rehearse that information with a view to maintaining it in mind, 
but do not use inner speech for the purpose of updating and processing the verbal information that is stored.  In 
the short-term memory tasks employed by Williams et al. and Russell et al., participants were provided with a 
sequence of items.  In contrast, for the self-ordered pointing task, participants need to generate a sequence of 
points based on a comparison of a stored representation of choices that have already been made with the choice 
that is to be made on each trial.  Such generativity and online processing/updating of working memory can be 
considered executive in nature.  As such, it may be the executive component of working memory, rather than the 
storage component, for which inner speech is underutilised among people with ASD.  This is the interpretation 
favoured by Joseph et al.  While this is plausible (and see Williams et al., 2012, for a related discussion of the 
distinction between monologic and dialogic inner speech use), it is not in keeping with the findings from other 
studies of executive functioning discussed above.  There are strikingly few unambiguous findings (other than 
those reported by Joseph et al.) that inner speech is not utilised to mediate executive functioning tasks. In our 
view, it would be important to replicate and extend the findings of Joseph et al. to resolve this discrepancy.  In 
particular, it would be informative to establish whether individuals with ASD whose self-ordered pointing 
ability is unaffected by the ease with which studied items are label-able (suggesting that they do not employ 
inner speech to mediate the task) nonetheless show a phonological similarity effect in their serial recall.  If this 
ZHUHWKHFDVHLWZRXOGVXSSRUW-RVHSKHWDO¶VK\SRWKHVLVWKDWLWLVWKHH[HFXWLYHGHPDQGVRIWKHVHOI-ordered 
pointing task that are impacted by a diminished tendency or diminished/atypical quality of inner speech use in 
ASD.   
Summary 




The majority of studies in this area appear to indicate developmentally appropriate verbal mediation of short-
term memory in ASD.  Two studies (involving closely matched ASD and comparison participants) have found 
that adults and children with ASD show typical phonological similarity effect in the serial recall of pictorial 
stimuli, indicating that short-term memory is mediated verbally (Williams et al., 2008; 2012).  Further 
supporting this conclusion, the Williams et al. (2012) study showed that serial recall performance was 
significantly detrimentally affected by articulatory suppression (although this study failed to include an 
appropriate control secondary task condition).  A further study by Whitehouse et al. (2007) suggested that 
individuals with ASD showed a diminished word length effect in serial recall.  This contrasts with not only the 
findings of Williams et al. (2008; 2012), who found an undiminished phonological similarity effect, but also 
with an early study by Russell et al. (1996) who observed an enhanced word length effect in children with ASD.  
A final study by Joseph et al. (2005) was the only study to explore working, rather than short-term, memory.  
The well-designed Joseph et al. study showed that individuals with ASD found the storage and processing of 
unnameable stimuli and easy-to-name stimuli equally difficult (unlike comparison participants who showed an 
advantage for nameable stimuli).  Understandably, Joseph et al. interpreted this as showing that individuals with 
ASD, unlike comparison participants, do not spontaneously use inner speech when stimuli are nameable.  This 
might suggest working memory is not verbally mediated in ASD, although independent replication of the 
finding would be welcome given the contradictory evidence from studies of short-term memory.     
Motor control 
Gidley Larson and Suchy (2014) investigated whether motor control is verbally mediated in ASD.  Twenty one 
adolescents with ASD and 22 QHXURW\SLFDOFRPSDULVRQSDUWLFLSDQWVSHUIRUPHGWKH³3XVK-Turn-7DS7DS´WDVN- a 
test of motor sequence learning from the Behavioural Dyscontrol Scale-Electronic Version (Kraybill & Suchy, 
2011).  In this task, participants are instructed to perform a repeated sequence of movements across 21 trials.  
The sequence involved pushing a joystick forward, then turn it clockwise, then tapping a button twice.  The task 
was completed under three different conditions.  First, participants completed 21 trials in silence.  Following 
this, they completed 21 trials under conditions that involved saying a task-congruent instruction before each step 
LQWKHVHTXHQFHLH³SXVK´³WXUQ´³WDS-WDS´RQHDFKWULDO)LQDOO\WKH\FRPSOHWHGWULDOVXQGHUFRQGLWLRQV
that involved saying a task-LQFRQJUXHQWLQVWUXFWLRQEHIRUHHDFKVWHSLQWKHVHTXHQFHLH³WDS-WDS´EHIRUH
pushing WKHMR\VWLFN³SXVK´EHIRUHturning WKHMR\VWLFNDQG³WXUQ´EHIRUHtapping the button).  In short, the 
rationale for this design was that if inner speech is not used to support control of motor learning, then relative to 




completion in silence, task performance should not be negatively affected by task-incongruent verbalisations, 
but it should be facilitated by task-congruent instruction (because participants are being forced to utilise 
language to guide their motor control; cf. Russell-Smith et al., 2014; Russell et al., 1999).  Four dependent 
variables were considered 
(a) Sequencing speed, which refers to the average speed of completion of the entire sequence of three 
moves across all 21 trials 
(b) Sequencing accuracy, which refers to the total number of sequencing errors made across the 21 trials 
(c) Motor speed, which refers to the average amount of time taken to complete one element of the 
sequence only, namely the tap-tap function (i.e., the latency between the first and second tap on each 
trial) 
(d) Motor accuracy, which refers to the number of errors made on the tap-tap element of the sequence 
(e.g., triple tap, rather than double tap). 
The authors reported RQSWKDW³DFURVVDOODQDO\VHVWKHVHYDOXHVZHUHXVHGDVGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHV
Condition [Silence/Task-congruent/Task-incongruent] was used as the within subjects factor, and Group 
[ASD/comparison] was used as the between-VXEMHFWVIDFWRU´This would have been a parsimonious strategy, 
DQGVKRXOGKDYH\LHOGHGDVSHFLILF*URXS[&RQGLWLRQLQWHUDFWLRQLIWKHDXWKRUV¶SUHGLFWLRQVZHUHERUQHRXWE\
the data (assuming measurement was valid and reliable; Strauss, 2001).  However, rather than completing a 2 x 
3 ANOVA with respect to each dependent variable (Sequencing speed, sequencing accuracy, motor speed, and 
motor accuracy), the authors instead completed two separate 2 (Group) x 2 (Condition) ANOVAs for each 
dependent variable.  Specifically, for each dependent variable, the authors conducted one ANOVA comparing 
group performance in the silent vs. task-incongruent condition.  The authors subsequently conducted a second 
ANOVA for each dependent variable comparing group performance in the silent condition vs. task-congruent 
condition.  Hence, eight ANOVAs were conducted on this data in all.  In each ANOVA, a Group x Condition 
interaction was predicted.  We have raised concerns about such a piecemeal approach to data analysis in relation 
to the study by Holland and Low (2010) above, so we will not repeat these here although they apply equally 
(and perhaps more so, given the large number of analyses performed).  We do note, however, that Gidley Larson 
and Suchy (2014) do not consistently break down significant interaction effects, sometimes reporting only 
within-participants contrasts and sometimes only between-participants contrasts, but never both.  This makes it 
difficult to interpret effects clearly, but we have attempted to do this on the basis of the information provided.  




Results from these ANOVAs are summarised in Table 3 and described as concisely as possible below, starting 
ZLWKWKHUHVXOWWKDWZDVPRVWLQNHHSLQJZLWKWKHDXWKRUV¶SUHGLFWLRQV 
In sum, only three out of the eight predicted interaction effects emerged (and not all of these three were 
straightforward to interpret): With respect to i) sequencing speed, a significant Group x Condition interaction 
effect emerged when comparing group performance in silent vs. task-congruent conditions.  This reflected 
slower sequence speed among participants with ASD than comparison participants in the silent condition, but 
not the task-congruent condition (within-participants contrasts were not conducted).  Within-subjects analysis 
showed that participants with ASD benefitted significantly more than comparison participants from task-
congruent verbalisations.  Most importantly, between-subjects analysis showed that the sequencing speed was 
significantly slower among ASD compared to control participants in the silent condition only.  This is exactly 
what would be expected if individuals with ASD became quicker at sequencing as a result of benefitting from 
overt self-talk.  This is a potentially very important finding (and contradicts the finding of Russell-Smith et al., 
2014, who could not elicit an increase in task performance among participants with ASD by encouraging overt 
self-talk).  However, it needs to be interpreted in light of the results from the seven other key analyses conducted 
in the study.  Unfortunately, none of these other results was unambiguously in keeping with the predictions 
made by the authors: 
(ii) with respect to sequencing accuracy (rather than speed) on the task, neither of the predicted interaction 
effects emerged (all ps for interaction effects .  That is, both groups benefitted equally from overt task-
relevant self-instruction and, conversely, were equally detrimentally affected by overt task-irrelevant self-
instruction.  Moreover, overall sequencing accuracy was superior among participants with ASD than among 
comparison participants, with the superiority reaching statistical significance in the ANOVA comparing group 
performance in the silent vs. task-incongruent conditions.   
(iii) with respect to motor accuracy, neither of the predicted interaction effects emerged (results in the paper are 
UHSRUWHGDV³16´. That is, both groups benefitted equally from overt task-relevant self-instruction and, 
conversely, were equally detrimentally affected by overt task-irrelevant self-instruction. 
(iv) with respect to motor speed, the predicted interaction effect did not emerge when group performance was 
compared in the silent vs. task-congruent conditions UHVXOWLQWKHSDSHUDUHUHSRUWHGDV³16´.  That is, with 
respect to motor speed, both groups benefitted equally from overt task-relevant self-instruction. 




(v) following from point (iv), with respect to motor speed, there was a significant Group x Condition interaction 
when group performance was compared in the silent vs. task-incongruent conditions.  Within-subjects analysis 
showed that participants with ASD were significantly less negatively affected by overt task-incongruent self-talk 
than comparison participants were.  This may suggest that participants with ASD were not employing inner 
speech to mediate motor speed.  However, even if this was the case, it is not clear that the under-utilisation of 
inner speech had a detrimental performance on motor speed in general.  That is, it is not clear that motor speed 
was significantly slower among participants with ASD than among comparison participants in any of the 
secondary task conditions, but surprisingly between-subjects analyses were not performed so it is not possible to 
know for sure.   
Summary 
Although there was one potentially positive result from Gidley Larson and Suchy (2014), all of the other results 
indicated either that participants with ASD did employ inner speech to mediate the task (contrary to predictions) 
or that if they did not employ inner speech typically it did not detrimentally affect their performance.  Like 
many of the other studies of inner speech use in ASD, therefore, there is a gap between theoretically-based 
predictions and actual empirical results.  The precise reasons for this gap are unclear and more work is needed to 
elucidate this issue.  But, in our view, future work should be informed by an acknowledgement of this gap - as 
we discuss below. 
Overall summary and future directions 
While we believe there are good theoretical reasons to believe that thinking is not verbally mediated among 
people with ASD to the same extent as it is among neurotypical individuals ± and that this contributes to 
executive dysfunction and diminished behavioural flexibility in this disorder ± the quality of the empirical 
evidence available to support such inclinations is not generally high, in our view.  To our knowledge, 13 
experiments have directly measured the extent to which self-talk is used by people with ASD to mediate 
(various domains of) cognition.  Of these 13 experiments, there are clear trends in the results reported.  For 
example, six out of seven studies that employ articulatory suppression as a means of assessing inner speech use 
reported that such suppression does not negatively influence task performance in ASD.  In each of these six 
studies, this lack of an articulatory suppression effect was interpreted as showing that task performance was not 
verbally mediated among participants with ASD.  This is impressive consistency across studies and could be 
taken as indication of the robustness of the findings.  However, most of the studies of articulatory suppression in 




ASD have potential methodological confounds (some very serious confounds, arguably), which could have 
compromised the validity of the results.  It is certainly possible to take the view that, given the apparent 
consistency of results across studies, the overall conclusion that inner speech is impaired in ASD is reliable even 
if the results from some individual studies are not valid.  We urge caution in that case though, because the study 
of inner speech use in ASD is only emerging and a small number of invalid results can quickly bias the field 
when it contains relatively few studies.  Moreover, the well-NQRZQ³ILOHGUDZHU´SUREOHPLQSV\FKRORJ\KDVDQ
especially large influence on emerging fields of study and it is possible that failures to replicate findings of 
diminished inner speech use in ASD go un-submitted to journals or unpublished if they are submitted.  We hope 
that these points will be borne in mind by authors and used to justify publication of any future studies that find 
inner speech usage to be typical in ASD. 
Setting aside any potential methodological difficulties with studies or with any hypothetical unpublished failures 
to replicate, there exists an anomaly in the results of existing research that has not been fully addressed to date.  
Assuming that inner speech use is diminished in ASD, there is very little evidence that such a diminution has a 
substantial negative effect on cognition.  For example, in all but two of the studies that report diminished inner 
speech use in ASD, no between-group differences in baseline cognitive task performance were observed.  That 
is, in the baseline condition of each study ±performance relative to which the effect of the experimental 
manipulation (e.g., articulatory suppression) was judged± participants with ASD did not show impaired 
performance.  Rather, between-group differences in these studies tended to emerge from the superior 
performance of individuals with ASD, relative to comparison participants, in the key experimental conditions of 
the experiments (e.g., in articulatory suppression conditions).  Thus, even if participants with ASD in these 
studies were not employing inner speech to mediate the baseline (i.e., silent) condition of the experimental tasks, 
there was little evidence that this was harming their performance.  Note, also, that in the only study of private 
speech use in ASD, Winsler et al. (2007) found that executive functioning task performance was diminished in 
their sample of ASD participants, despite the fact that self-talk was not diminished.  Thus, some studies observe 
diminished self-talk in ASD alongside unimpaired cognitive task performance, whereas other studies observe 
diminished cognitive task performance alongside unimpaired self-talk.  This is problematic for theories that 
propose a) inner speech is necessary for (or at least contributes to) efficient executive functioning and 
behavioural flexibility, and b) that diminished inner speech use explains (or at least contributes to) executive 
dysfunction and behavioural inflexibility in ASD.  There are several possible explanations for this seeming 
anomaly, four of which follow.  




First, it might be that inner speech use is diminished in ASD and that this diminution contributes to everyday, 
real-world difficulties with executive functioning and self-regulation, but that the laboratory-based measures of 
executive functioning used in these studies were not sensitive enough to detect impairments.  While this is 
possible, it is purely speculative as things stand.  It would be interesting to explore in future studies whether, for 
example, the extent to which articulatory suppression affects executive task performance is related to self-
reported difficulties with executive functioning in everyday life among people with ASD (e.g., using the 
Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function, which has revealed real-world executive functioning 
impairments in both children [Granader et al., 2014] and adults [Wallace et al., 2016] with ASD).  Perhaps more 
important still would be to explore the effects of both articulatory suppression and overt labelling on 
ecologically-valid tasks, such as subtests (e.g., Key Search or Zoo Map) from the Behavioural Assessment of 
Dysexecutive Syndrome that tap executive functioning across various subdomains (e.g., Planning and 
Flexibility).   
Second, it might be that inner speech use is diminished in ASD, but that individuals with these impairments 
have available to them alternative strategies to successfully negotiate (laboratory and real-world) executive 
tasks.  For example, several studies suggest that, at least in some respects, individuals with ASD have enhanced 
visual processing skills (e.g., Mottron et al., 2006).  These skills could be employed as a successful means of 
mediating executive tasks among individuals with ASD, whereas neurotypical individuals rely heavily on inner 
speech use for success.  This possibility is supported by the finding of Williams et al. (2012, Experiment 2) that 
successful planning was associated with performance on an indirect measure of visuo-spatial processing among 
individuals with ASD, but not among TD participants.  :LOOLDPVHWDO¶VGDWDZHUHSXUHO\FRUUHODWLRQDO, 
however.  What is needed to test this second possibility is a study that requires participants to complete a 
secondary task that is equivalent to articulatory suppression in terms of general processing requirements, but 
which a) taps visuo-spatial resources, rather than inner speech use, and b) does not tap the key resources 
required for performance on the primary (e.g., executive) task.  If people with ASD really do employ visual 
resources to mediate executive functioning tasks, then such a visuo-spatial secondary task should negatively 
affect performance among individuals with ASD significantly more than it should negatively affect performance 
among neurotypical individuals. 
Third, it may be that the differences in findings across studies are the result of sampling differences.  ASD is a 
highly heterogeneous disorder (at all levels of explanation/description).  Perhaps reduced inner speech use does 




contribute to behavioural and cognitive impairments in some individuals, or sub-group(s) of individuals, with 
ASD, but not others.  Future research would benefit from assessing the relation between inner speech use and 
participant characteristics (cf. Lidstone et al., 2009; Williams & Jarrold, 2010).  
Fourth, it may be that inner speech use is typical in ASD per se, at least in some cognitive/behavioural domains.  
This possibility should be taken seriously, in our view (as should possibility 2; even though both contradict the 
general theory of inner speech development that we espouse).  
Finally, it is important to consider the clinical/practical relevance of the findings from this critical review.  A 
surface reading of the literature on inner speech in ASD might lead clinicians and educators to prioritize verbal 
labelling and encouragement of self-talk to facilitate everything from solving mathematics problems at 
school/home to aiding in dealing with difficult transitions that people with ASD might experience in their daily 
lives.  Therefore, it is crucial that future work clarifies what appears on further scrutiny to be a more clouded 
picture of the (a)typicality of inner speech use and function in ASD.  It is also possible, if not probable, that 
some interventionists already employ verbal labelling and other techniques in attempts to improve language 
function (if not explicit attempts to target inner speech itself).  For example, a recently developed intervention 
that targets executive function deficits in ASD, ³Unstuck and On Target!´, makes critical use of verbal labelling 
and verbal scripts throughout its curriculum (Cannon, Kenworthy, Alexander, Werner, & Anthony, 2011; 
Kenworthy et al., 2014).  However, to our knowledge, no studies to date have focused specifically on the 
utilization of these strategies and their effectiveness in groups of individuals with ASD.  We noted above that 
several studies of verbal thinking in ASD have explored the effect on cognitive task performance of enforcing 
overt (private) speech.  The logic driving these study designs, as expressed more or less explicitly by the study 
authors, is that, if people with ASD do not spontaneously utilize inner speech to mediate a cognitive task and if 
this contributes to their usual limitations on those tasks, then enforcing overt speech will improve cognitive task 
performance (perhaps to the level of neurotypical individuals who do spontaneously mediate the task verbally).  
In other words, artificially enforcing verbal mediation of a task will eliminate a usual deficit on that task that is 
caused by a failure to utilize verbal mediation spontaneously.  When discussing each of these studies above, it 
was important to draw attention to the fact that almost all studies failed to support the DXWKRUV¶hypothesis.  
Specifically, apart from the study by Gidley Larson and Suchy (2014), no study has found that enforcing overt 
speech significantly improved the cognitive task performance of participants with ASD (although the baseline 
performance of participants was not generally impaired anyway).  It is always important to make clear when 




theory-driven hypotheses are not supported, because it often implies that the theory is not entirely correct.  
However, another possibility in this particular case is that the predictions stemming from the theory, rather than 
the theory itself, are invalid.  The logic of attempting to enforce verbal mediation assumes that the effect will be 
the same as if the normal social-cognitive/developmental routes to verbal mediation had been followed.  Yet, it 
may well be that such explicit instruction fails to replicate the effect on cognition that neurotypical individuals 
develop and harness via implicit/long-term learning (Diaz & Berk, 1995).  From a neo-Vygotskian perspective, 
verbal thinking develops out of complex social interactions via an implicit internalisation process over many 
years.  It may be too much to expect instructional training, especially in short-term experimental studies, to 
achieve the desired impact of increasing the influence of language on thought among people with ASD 
(although, note that it does appear to achieve the desired impact in other disorders; Perry et al., 2001).  Having 
said this, as stressed multiple times in this paper, the evidence that people with ASD do not employ inner speech 
is not watertight and the evidence that a failure to employ inner speech results directly in cognitive deficits is 
even less evident.  Thus, based on evidence to date, it is not clear that intervention efforts should necessarily be 
targeted at the enhancement of verbal thinking in ASD.  It seems clear that carefully controlled investigation is 
required in this area to interrogate these questions more clearly.  One possible future direction is to 
systematically target inner speech for intervention in ASD compared to one or more control groups (e.g., 
individuals with ASD vs. typically developing controls, or children with ASD vs. children with specific 
language impairment) to examine the malleability of these abilities and whether they in turn have a cascading 
influence on executive function and other problem-solving and real-world skills.   
Relatedly, the influence of common co-morbidities in ASD, such as ADHD and/or specific language 
impairment, on inner speech usage has not been examined.  Given that prior studies demonstrate atypical 
utilization of private speech in children with ADHD and other behaviour problems (Berk & Potts, 1991; Winsler 
et al., 2000) and possible delays in inner speech development in specific language impairment (Lidstone et al., 
2012), this is clearly an important question for future research to tackle.  There has been indirect examination of 
co-morbid intellectual disability and specific language impairment via (verbal) IQ subgrouping and/or matching 
on metrics of mental age, but it has not been systematic.  Particular ASD co-morbidities/subgroups might be 
driving the inner speech impairments documented in prior studies or alternatively could be clouding the picture 
leading to failed replication of study findings in some cases.  Similarly, more studies that employ additional 
clinical control groups could be helpful in determining the specificity of these findings to ASD.  Different 




patterns of intact and impaired inner speech function in various clinical groups could eventually drive 
differential approaches to intervention.   
Finally, future research in this area should address heterogeneity and developmental processes in ASD.  
Evidence regarding group-level differences (or similarities) in levels or patterns of performance on cognitive 
tasks is important, but it may hide underlying heterogeneity in cognitive and behavioural profiles of people with 
ASD.  All of the studies reviewed in this paper employed ASD participants who were diagnosed according to 
pre-DSM-5 criteria, but future studies will employ the more recent DSM-5 guidelines, which may have an effect 
on results (albeit only a subtle effect, most likely; Volkmar & Reichow, 2013).  Regardless of diagnostic 
criteria, if ASD is characterised by diminished verbal thinking, it is very unlikely that all people with ASD fail 
to utilize inner speech.  It will be important to establish what drives individual differences in this capacity 
among people with ASD, as well as to investigate its developmental trajectory.  
Research on inner speech use in ASD has the potential to inform general theories of the development and 
function of verbal thinking, as well as to have a transformative effect on clinical practice.  It is precisely because 
of this potential importance that we believe a detailed critical analysis of results is necessary and timely.   The 
aim of the review is to take stock of, and draw accurate conclusions from, existing empirical findings, as well as 
to help develop the directions for future research that will resolve the outstanding issues in this field.  At first 
glance, research on inner speech in ASD to date has tended to support Vygotskian notions of the nature, 
development, and function of self-talk, as well as point out potentially useful treatment targets (e.g., verbal 
labelling, self-talk, etc.) for people with ASD.  However, upon closer examination of the evidence to date with a 
critical eye, methodological shortcomings and anomalous findings temper these expectations. Only through 
careful and systematic future research can the outstanding theoretical and clinical questions posed here (as well 
as many others) be answered more definitively as we seek to understand the role that self-talk plays in mediating 
cognitive and behavioural functioning in ASD. 
  





1. Winsler et al. also investigated private speech use among the same sample when completing a general 
problem-VROYLQJWDVNWKH³%XLOGLQJ6WLFNV7DVN´DQGREVHUYHGDYHU\VLPLODUSDWWHUQRIUHVXOWVWRWKRVHIURP
the WCST study.      
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Table 1: Techniques for measuring verbal thinking 
Technique Procedure Rationale 
Articulatory 
suppression  
(dual task design) 
Participants repeat a simple word or 
phrase while completing the 
primary task of interest.   
 
Primary task performance completed under 
articulatory suppression is compared to primary 
task performance under alternative secondary 
conditions (e.g., silence; foot tapping). 
If a person uses inner speech to mediate the 
primary task under normal circumstances, then 
articulatory suppression should diminish their 
primary task performance significantly more than 
alternative secondary task conditions disrupt 
performance, because articulatory suppression 
selectively disrupts inner speech.  
 
Overt labelling  
(dual task design) 
Participants articulate task 
instructions or verbal strategies 
relevant to primary task 
completion. 
Primary task performance completed under 
enforced self-talk is usually compared to primary 
task performance under silent conditions. 
If a person does not use inner speech to mediate 
the primary task under normal circumstances (i.e., 
silence), then enforced overt self-talk should 
enhance primary task performance, because it 
enforces the kind of verbal mediation that is absent 
in spontaneous situations. 
 
Similarity effects in 
memory 
During short-term/working memory 
task (usually during the study 
phase), the properties of (pictorial) 
items are manipulated to influence 
the extent to which verbal 
mediation is possible or probable 
If short-term/working memory is verbally 
mediated, then pictures of objects that have long, 
phonologically similar, or difficult-to-articulate, 
names should be less reliably recalled than 
pictures of objects that have short, phonologically 
dissimilar, or easy-to-articulate, names.  If the 
phonological properties of pictorial stimuli affect 
recall, then this must show that the images have 
been recoded from a visual into a verbal 
representation.  However, if memory is not 
verbally mediated, then the phonological 
properties of items should not impact on recall. 
 
Analysis of private 
speech 
Record participants while they 
complete a task.  Analyse 
If task performance is verbally mediated, then 
³task-relevant´ private speech (i.e., overt speech 




recordings for the number of overt 
utterances made and code these 
according to whether they were a) 
fully overt or partially internalised; 
b) relevant to the task, c) associated 
with task performance 
that is about the task one is completing) should be 
used, particularly during moments of difficulty on 
the task.    
 




Table 2: Studies examining verbal thinking in autism spectrum disorder. 















Age: 15.74 (2.10);  




TD (n=25): Age: 
16.36 (1.83);  

























No, according to omnibus test; Group (ASD/NT) × condition 
(articulatory suppression/silence) interaction: F(1,51) = 
1.08, p = .30. 
Yes, according to post hoc tests;  
 
Within-participants t tests: NT performance significantly worse in 
articulatory suppression condition than in silent condition: t(24) = 
2.34, p = .03.  ASD performance non-significantly affected by 
condition: t(27) = 1.13, p = .27.   
 
Between-participants t tests: ASD participants showed 
significantly poorer planning in the silent condition, t(51) = 2.28, 
p = .03, but not the articulatory suppression condition, t(51) = 
0.01, p = .99 
 
/DFNRI³YLVXR-VSDWLDO´
control condition  
 




















Yes.  Significant Group (ASD/NT) × Condition (articulatory 
suppression/silence) interaction, F(1, 29) = 5.69, p = .02.   
 
Within-participants t tests: NT performance significantly worse in 
articulatory suppression condition than in silent condition: t (15) 
/DFNRI³YLVXR-VSDWLDO´
control condition 


















DV = No. of 
moves taken to 
complete each 
trial 
= 3.46, p = .003.  ASD performance non-significantly affected by 
condition: t (14) = 0.20, p = .85.   
 
Between-participants t tests: ASD and NT participants show 
equivalent planning in the silent condition, t (29) = 0.72, p = .48, 
but ASD participants show better planning than NT participants 
in the articulatory suppression condition, t(29) = 2.15, p = .04. 







ASD (n=13):  


























DV = Time taken 
to complete each 
trial 
Yes.  Significant Group (ASD/NT) × Condition (articulatory 
suppression/visuo-spatial suppression/silence) on completion time 
F(2, 23) = 9.70, p < .01.  
 
Within-participants contrasts (Bonferroni adjusted): NT 
performance significantly slower in articulatory and visuo-spatial 
FRQGLWLRQVWKDQLQWKHVLOHQWFRQGLWLRQ³DOOpV´$6'
performance significantly slower in visuo-spatial condition than 
in the VLOHQWRUDUWLFXODWRU\VXSSUHVVLRQFRQGLWLRQV³DOOpV´
but no significant difference between silent and articulatory 
VXSSUHVVLRQFRQGLWLRQV³p !´ 
 
Use of a task single trial 
in all conditions; groups 
not matched for age or 
VIQ; Inappropriate visuo
spatial control task; 
piecemeal data analysis 




Between-participants t tests: ASD and NT participants show 
equivalent planning speed in the silent condition, t (24) = 1.30, p 
> .05, and the visuo-spatial suppression condition, t (24) = 0.66, p 
> .05.   
However, ASD participants show faster planning than NT 
participants in the articulatory suppression condition, t(24) = 4.56, 
p < .001. 











Age: 10.91 (1.75);  
100% male 
VMA: 9.42 (2.83) 
Non-verbal ability 




Age: 8.33 (0.83);  
100% male 
VMA: 9.17 (1.42) 
Non-verbal ability 








































DV = Time taken 
to complete each 
set of lists  
 
 
Yes (but not clearly in a reanalysis of the data by Lidstone et al.).  
Significant Group (ASD/NT) × Task (Switching/non-switching) × 
Condition (articulatory suppression/silence) interaction in an 
ANCOVA (controlling for non-verbal ability), F(1, 43) = 7.30, p 
< .02.   
 
Within-participants contrasts: NT performance in both switching 
(adding, then subtracting lists of numbers) and non-switching 
(e.g., only adding lists of numbers) significantly worse in 
articulatory suppression condition than in silent condition: t(22) = 
5.66, p < .001 (switching task), t(22) = 4.23, p < .001 (non-
switching task).  ASD performance non-significantly affected by 
condition: t(22) = .76, p = .45 (switching task), t(22) = 1.94, p = 
.06 (non-switching task).  
 
Between-participants t tests: ASD and NT participants show 
equivalent performance in the switching task in the silent 
 
 
Groups not matched for 
age, VIQ, or PIQ; 
reanalysis of data by 
Lidstone et al. suggested 
verbal mediation was 
developmentally 
appropriate in ASD (see 
Williams & Jarrold, 2010



















condition, F(1,43) = 0.23, p = .63, but ASD participants show 
better performance than NT participants in the switching task in 
the articulatory suppression condition, F(1,43) = 3.88, p = .05. 
 






ASD (n=13):  

















e et al., 
2006, Exp. 
1. 
Exp 1: Group 







DV = Time taken 
to complete each 
set of lists 
Yes.  In Exp. 1, significant Group (ASD/NT) × Condition 
(articulatory suppression/silence) interaction in an ANOVA, F(1, 
24) = 4.30, p < .05. But note: the three way interaction involving 
Task (switching/non-switching) was apparently non-significant, 
although inferential statistics were not reported by Holland and 
Low.   
 
Within-participants contrasts: NT performance across switching 
and non-switching tasks collapsed significantly worse in 
articulatory suppression condition than in silent condition: F(1,12) 
= 21.20, p < .01 ASD performance across switching and non-
Groups not matched for 
age or VIQ; Inappropriate 
visuo-spatial control task; 
piecemeal data analysis 
(data from exps 1 and 2 
should have been 
combined for analysis) 




Exp 2: Group 







DV = Time taken 
to complete each 
set of lists 
switching tasks collapsed was non-significantly affected by 
condition: F(1,12) = 1.88, p > .05.   
 
Between-participants contrasts: Not reported.  Figure 1 in 
Holland and Low (p.376) appears to indicate no between-group 
differences in performance in the silent condition, but superior 
(faster) performance among ASD participants than NT 
participants in the articulatory suppression condition.   
 
In Exp. 2, non-significant Group (ASD/NT) × Condition (Visuo-
spatial suppression/silence) interaction in an ANOVA, F(1,24) = 
.01, p > .05.  Again, the three way interaction involving Task 
(switching/non-switching) was not reported by Holland and Low.  
 
Within-participants contrasts: Both ASD and NT participants 
performed less well (slower) in the visuo-spatial suppression 
condition than in the silent condition, all ts > 4.51, all ps < .01.    
 
Between-participants contrasts: Not reported.  Figure 1 in 
Holland and Low (p.376) appears to indicate no between-group 
differences in performance in either the silent or visuo-spatial 
suppression condition. 

























× Verbal ability 
 
 
Yes, as measured by effect of articulatory suppression; 
No, as measured by effect of overt labelling:   
 




al. (2014) 82% male; 
VIQ: 101.4 (14.8) 




Age: 10.69 (2.25);  
89% male;  
VIQ: 109.6 (14.7) 















DVs = No. of 
perseverative 
errors; No. of 
categories 
completed; No. of 
correct responses 
Covariate = age 
Significant Group × Condition interaction in an ANOVA for two 
of the three DVs - perseverative errors, F(3, 81) = 4.97, p = .01, 
and responses correct, F(3, 81) = 3.68, p = .02.  The statistics for 
the Group × Condition interaction effect associated with the other 
DV (no. of categories completed) were not reported by Russell-
Smith et al. 
 
Within-participant contrasts: Among NT participants, 
performance was poorer in the articulatory suppression condition 
than in the silent condition, in terms of both no. of perseverative 
errors,  F(1,14) = 6.59, p = .02, and no. of responses correct 
F(1,14) = 4.88, p = .04.  In contrast, performance in the talk-aloud 
condition was significantly better than in the silent condition, in 
terms of no. of perseverative errors, F(1,14) = 4.50, p = .05.  Also, 
NT participants had more correct responses in the talk aloud 
condition than in the mouthing condition, F(1,14) = 5.16, p = .04.  
Among ASD participants, the effect of condition was non-
significant for both perseverative errors and correct responses, 
³)´ 
 
Between-participants contrasts: Not reported.  Figure 2 in 
Russell-Smith et al. (p.1239) appears to indicate no between-
group differences in performance in any of the conditions with 
respect to no. of responses correct or no. of categories completed 
(based on overlapping error bars).  With respect to no. of 
perseverative errors, participants with ASD appear to make 
significantly more perseverative errors than NT participants in the 




silent and talk-aloud conditions, but this is not certain because 
inferential statistics are not reported.  









Age: 10.3 (3.2); 












Main effect of 
Group 
(ASD/ADHD/Typ






No, private speech use was as frequent and frequently task 
relevant as in typically developing children 
Groups not matched for 
verbal ability, non-verbal 
ability, or gender 
 














Age: 10.91 (1.75);  
100% male 
VMA: 9.42 (2.83) 
Non-verbal ability 




































Yes, as reflected by a diminished word length effect.  Significant 
Group × Condition × Secondary task interaction in an ANCOVA: 
F(1, 43) = 4.14, p < .05.   
Whitehouse et al. then explored Group × Condition interactions in 
each secondary task condition separately.  The interaction effects 
were significant both in the silent secondary task condition, 





Groups not matched for 
age or VIQ 






Age: 8.33 (0.83);  
100% male 
VMA: 9.17 (1.42) 
Non-verbal ability 
raw score: 35.5 
(4.7)* 
 




33.77, p < .001. ASD participants showed a diminished word 
length effect in both secondary task conditions, which was 
unexpected by Whitehouse et al. 




Age: 12.38 (2.95) 
VMA = 6.27 
(1.19) 
 
MLD (n=33)  
Age: 10.82 (1.94) 



















× Recall mode 
(Verbal/non-
verbal) 
DV = memory 
span 
No, normal word length effect.   
Significant Group × Condition × Recall mode interaction: F(2, 
96) = 3.69, p = .03.   
Post hoc contrasts:  
Significant Group × Condition interaction for nonverbal recall, 
F(2, 90) = 3.12, p = .05, but not for verbal recall, F(2, 90) = 1.44, 
p = .24.  Figure 1 and Table 2 in Russell et al (p.676) show that 
ASD participants had a non-significantly larger word length 
effect than NT participants and a significantly larger word length 
effect than MLD participants in the nonverbal recall condition.  
Between-group differences in the size of the word length effect 
were non-significant in the verbal recall condition.  Within-
participants analyses showed that participants with ASD were 
unique in showing a significantly larger word length effect in the 
non-verbal than verbal recall, F(1, 90) = 5.82, p = .02. 
Groups not matched for 
age or VIQ 
        
Williams ASD (n=25): No Phonological Serial Group (ASD/NT) No, developmentally normal phonological similarity effect, and - 





































stimuli) × verbal 
mental age (< 7 
years/>7 years) 
DV = no of 
correctly recalled 
trials 
visual similarity effect.  
No significant Group × Verbal mental age interaction, F(1, 41) = 
.07, p = .80, or Group × Condition × Verbal mental age 
interaction , F(2, 82) = 0.52, p = .60.  There was a significant 
Condition × Verbal mental age interaction, F (2, 82) = 7.54, p = 
.001.   
 
Post hoc contrasts revealed that, among participants with verbal 
mental ages over seven years, control stimuli were recalled 
significantly better than phonologically similar stimuli (indicating 
a phonological similarity effect), F(1, 31) = 15.74, p < .001, but 
not than visually similar stimuli (indicating no visual similarity 
effect), F(1, 31) < .01, p > .99.  Among participants with verbal 
mental ages under seven years the opposite pattern was present 
with control stimuli better recalled than visually similar stimuli 
(indicating a visual similarity effect), F(1, 12) = 4.59, p = .05, but 
not than phonologically similar stimuli (indicating no 
phonological similarity effect), F(1, 12) = .18, p = .68. 































No, normal phonological similarity effect and normal articulatory 
suppression effect. 
No significant main effect of group, F (1, 32) = 0.87, p = .36; no 
significant Group × Secondary task interaction, F(1, 32) = 0.71, p 
= .41;  no significant Group × Condition interaction F (1, 32) = 
0.58, p = .45; no significant Group × Condition × Secondary task 

























Age: 8.92 (2.33); 
87.5% male;  
VIQ: 94 (19);  
PIQ: 99 (20);  
FSIQ: 96 (18) 
 
TD (n=24): 
Age: 8.92 (2.17);  
79% male;  
VIQ: 89 (12);  
PIQ: 94 (14);  
FSIQ: 92 (13) 
 


















DV = no. of errors 
Yes, ASD deficits in the namable condition only. Significant 
Group × Condition interaction, F(1,46) = 10.8, p < .001.   
 
Within-participants contrasts: Among comparison children, 
performance was better in the namable than non-namable 
condition, t(23) = 4.7, p < .001, whereas there was no difference 
in performance across conditions among ASD participants, t(23) 
= 0.2, n.s. 
 
Between-participants contrasts: Participants with ASD performed 
significantly less well than comparison children in the nameable 
condition, t(46) = 2.4, p < .02, but not the non-namable condition, 
t(46) = 1.0, n.s. 
- 


































































speed, and motor 
accuracy 
Ambiguous: In 5 of 8 analyses, the predicted Group x Condition 
interactions did not emerge and in the three that did emerge the 
cause was not always clear. 
*Note: The authors departed from this design in the data analysis 
by conducting eight 2 (Group) × 2 (Condition) ANOVAS, rather 
than four 2 (Group) × 3 (Condition) ANOVAs.   
 
Piecemeal data analysis; 
Four ANOVAs should 
have been completed, one 
for each DV.  Instead, 




Notes:  NS = non-significant; DV = dependent variable; VMA = verbal mental age; VIQ = verbal IQ; PIQ = performance IQ; FSIQ = full-scale IQ; NT = neurotypical; *Baseline 
characteristics (age, VMA, non-verbal raw score) for participants in Whitehouse et al. (2006, exps 2 and 3 are based on those provided in their Table 1 (p.858).  Seven additional 
children (four ASD; three NT) were added for experiments 2 and 3, but means and SDs were not reported for this extended sample.  
 
  
















F(1, 41) = 8.46; p = .006 Within-participants: 
NT group: poorer in incongruent than silent condition, p = .002;  
ASD group: no effect of condition, p = .53 




F(1, 41) = 1.46; p = .23 None reported (because interaction non-significant), but significant main effect of Group in ANOVA, reflecting superior 
accuracy in ASD than comparison participants, p < .05 
Motor speed F(1, 41) = 5.55, p = .02 Within-participants: 
NT group: poorer in incongruent than silent condition, p = .001;  
ASD group: no effect of condition, p = .85. 











F(1, 41) = 12.81; p = .001,  Within-participants: Not reported 
Between-participants: 




F(1, 41) = .454; p = .504,  None reported (because interaction non-significant), but no main effect of Group in ANOVA p = .272. 
Motor speed NS ³QRVLJQLILFDQWPDLQHIIHFWVRULQWHUDFWLRQVDOOSYDOXHV!´S 
Motor 
accuracy 
NS ³QRVLJQLILFDQWPDLQHIIHFWVRULQWHUDFWLRQVDOOSYDOXHV!´S 
 
